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PUNCTURING THE FUNNEL-SAVING THE "ANY WILLING
PROVIDER" STATUTES FROM ERISA PREEMPTION
Sharon Reece*
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), like Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), was a result of the high cost and low
oversight of the traditional fee for service model in medical care. Although
cast in the light of "freedom to contract," managed care arguably restricted
competition by funneling a ready supply of patients to a few selected pro-
viders. In response, the market outcasts lobbied for laws to permit them
access into the provider networks-these statutes, called "Any Willing Pro-
vider" (AWP) laws, enabled any provider willing to satisfy the MCO's cri-
teria the ability to participate in servicing a ready supply of the organiza-
tion's patients.
In response to these laws, managed care asked, What about our free-
dom to contract? What about our right to control quality? What about our
right to control costs? What about our monopoly?
MCOs struck back with litigation. They invited the courts to find that
the federal pension law, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) l preempted any statutory action that related to managed care due
to its employee benefit nature. The only way for the AWP laws to escape
this preemption would be for the courts to find that the statutes did not re-
late to employee benefit plans within the meaning of the preemption provi-
sions, or to deem those laws as laws regulating insurance and therefore
saved from preemption under the Insurance Savings Clause. In April 2004
the United States Supreme Court deemed just that and found that ERISA
does not preempt Kentucky's AWP law because of the Savings Clause. The
Court provided a new test which AWP laws will be required to satisfy in
order to escape preemption under the Savings Clause.
This article explains the history and development of the issue, explores
the economic ramifications before and after the Court's ruling, and exam-
ines the statutes about to confront the Court's new test to determine if they
have a saving relationship with ERISA. This article discusses the following
issues: the rise of managed care and the reason for adoption of the AWP
* The author received her J.D. from Hofstra University School of Law and her LL.M.
in Taxation from New York University School of Law. She subsequently taught at the Al-
bany Law School and Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, for many years. She is
currently a Visiting Associate Professor of Law at the William H. Bowen School of Law at
the University of Arkansas in Little Rock. Professor Reece would like to thank her research
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laws, the collision of these laws with the preemption provisions of ERISA,
and the Supreme Court's response to the Kentucky AWP law. The article
also examines whether other states can benefit from the saving of one
state's law and explores the impact of the Supreme Court's decision on the
provider and the recipient of care.
1I. HISTORY OF MANAGED CARE
Unlike previous generations who paid for medical services on a fee-
for-service basis, health care for most Americans today involves member-
ship in a MCO. 2 Traditionally, in the United States health care milieu, hos-
pitals and physicians were reimbursed on a fee-for-service basis for medical
services and procedures. The fee-for-service model led to rising health care
costs because insurers paid for what the doctor ordered without any over-
sight. Under the "fee-for-service" model, patients paid fees for price-tagged
services. The more services a doctor ordered, the more the patient would
pay. The lack of administrative oversight allowed the ordering of extensive,
and arguably unnecessary, services. Individual physicians and hospitals
made more money whenever more procedures were ordered and the most
expensive technologies were used.3
To shift the risk away from the patient, indemnity insurance was often
provided. To some extent, shifting and spreading risk is always economi-
cally wise. Most individuals have minimal medical costs, but a few others,
like those with debilitating and chronic illness, may have crippling costs.
Employers could pool these individuals and diversify or spread that risk.4
For a monthly or yearly fee, an individual could receive coverage for certain
services. Indemnity insurance allowed patients to receive care from any
licensed provider, and the costs for services would be partially or fully cov-
ered.5 Medical insurance was not much of an improvement over the fee-for-
service model because it was fee-for-service based and suffered the same
costly ills.6 Costs were not controlled---only spread among the participants.
The costs were not only affecting the patients but also their employers.
United States employers were at a competitive disadvantage because other
industrialized nations spent much less on healthcare as a cost of doing busi-
2. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Managed Care Insurer Liability (Oct.
2002) available at www.ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm [hereinafter NCSL] (indicating
that recent studies demonstrate at least 170 million participate in MCO managed health care),
3. RICHARD D. LAMM, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF HEALTHCARE 89 (2003).
4. See THOMAS E. GETZEN, HEALTH ECONOMICS: FUNDAMENTALS AND FLOW OF FUNDS
210(1997).
5. DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: FROM
MARCUS WELBY TO MANAGED CARE 7 (2000).
6. Id.
[Vol. 27
PUNCTURING THE FUNNEL
ness. 7 Some United States companies spent up to nineteen percent of their
labor costs on health insurance. In fact, the current projection is that by
2005, the United States will be spending 14.9% of its gross domestic prod-
uct on healthcare.8 Despite the United States's expenditure on healthcare,
the country ranks thirty-seventh in health care quality worldwide.9 The fact
that Americaus neither enjoiy greater health n3r hae better prognoses be-
cause of these expenditures is counterintuitive.'1 Some argue that empiri-
cally,
[d]espite years of insistence by politicians and physicians that the United
States had the best medical care in the world, there is scant evidence that
the additional expenditures led to improvements in longevity, infant
mortality, morbidity, or days lost from work, relative to other countries
spending less than half as much per person. 1
To stem the tide of spiraling healthcare costs, management of the
healthcare industry was explored. In fact, the MCO domination of the health
care industry is a direct result of the rising costs under the fee-for-service
model-where physicians were compensated for the services delivered,
even if unnecessary.12
Managed care plans operate by selling health care services, typically to
an employer, on behalf of consumer-employees, and the employees access
their medical care by enrolling in a network of preselected providers.'
3
7. See DRANOVE, supra note 5, at 65 (observing that costs for providing healthcare in
"Canada, Europe and Japan were 25-50% less than in the United States and were paid for by
the government").
8. LAMM, supra note 3, at xii.
9. Id.
10. Id. at xi.
11. GETZEN, supra note 4, at 209 (citing Victor Fuchs, The Best Health Care System in
the World?, Journal of the American Medical Association, 268(7):916-17 (1992); Jack Had-
ley, More Medical Care, Better Health?, Washington, DC: The Urban Institute Press (1982);
OECD, OECD Health Data: Comparative Analysis of Health Systems, Paris: Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (1995)).
12. Sharon Reece, The Circuituous Journey to the Patients'Bill of Rights: Winners and
Losers 65 ALB. L. REv. 17 (2001).
13. Justin Goodyear, Wat is an Employee Benefit Plan?: ERISA Preemption of "Any
Willing Provider" Laws After Pegram, 101 COLUMBIA. L. REv 1107. A classic example of
how prepayment for medical services became a precursor to managed care plans can be seen
in the development of the Kaiser-Permanente program. DRANOVE, supra note 5, at 38-39.
The Kaiser Industrial Organization, with its principal, Henry Kaiser, owned several compa-
nies. Id. A California physician named Sidney Garfield approached Mr. Kaiser with the
proposal that for a certain daily rate per employee the doctor would provide unlimited medi-
cal services to the Kaiser employees. Id. Dr. Garfield repeated this plan in the state of Wash-
ington, providing prepaid family medicine for Kaiser employees working on construction of
the Grand Coulee Dam. Id.
As Kaiser expanded, it built medical and hospital facilities for 200,000 employees
2005] 409
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Managed care plans form a network of providers with whom they negotiate
a prepaid fee to provide services to the employee enrollees. If enrollees re-
ceive treatment from providers outside the network, they are required to pay
all or some of their treatment costs.
14
Fundamentally, MCOs differ from traditional fee-for-service models
because MCOs manage care by "interven[ing] to monitor and control the
transaction between the doctor and the patient." 15 MCOs limit costs by con-
tracting with a limited network of providers to whom its members can visit.
The MCOs, in turn, pay those providers a predetermined fee, or "capitation
rate."' 16 MCOs literally captured the industry, which forced providers to join
up or lose business.' 7 Of individuals with employer-sponsored health insur-
ance, managed care covered ninety-five percent by 2002, up from ninety-
two percent in 2000 and seventy-three percent in 1996.18
MCOs include both HMOs 19 and Preferred Provider Organizations
(PPOs). 20 PPOs operate on a predetermined contracted rate with certain
and hired physicians to provide medical care in group practice settings. Id. Later, Kaiser
opened its plan to the public, and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan was born. Id. It was not
called an HMO until 1970, when Paul Elwood coined the term. Id.
The Kaiser Foundation Health Plan provided health insurance to a variety of enrol-
lee's, typically employees, on site in exchange for an annual premium paid by the employer.
Id. The plan also compensated providers who cared for the enrollees. Id. Later, it secured all
physician services under an exclusive prepayment arrangement with a provider group, called
the Regional Permanente Group. Id. The doctors in the Permanente group provided care
exclusively for Kaiser enrollees. Id.
14. DEBORAH HAAS-WILSON, MANAGED CARE AND MONOPOLY POWER: THE ANTI-
TRUST CHALLENGER 24 (2003).
15. GETZEN, supra note 4, at 211. It is tempting to consider the managed care model as
a new phenomenon. In reality, its precursor, prepaid services in healthcare can be traced to
the 1890's. DRANovE, supra note 5, at 36. In the late nineteenth century a few physicians
would accept prepayment for providing medical services to certain groups like fraternal
orders, unions, and other worker's associations. This fixed prepayment provided enrollees
with unlimited free access to medical care in exchange for an annual fee per member.
Whether the patient needed more or less care the amount remained the same. This was not
widespread, and often care was limited to work-related injuries. See id.
In the late nineteenth century many physicians refused to be a part of this system. T.
Mayen & G. Mayen, HMO's: Origins and Development, NEW. ENG. J. MED. 312, 590-94
(1985). The AMA did not support prepayment for medical services and found the idea of
"unlimited service for limited pay," objectionable. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 216 (1982). Physicians have even been found
guilty of conspiring to squash the growth of prepaid insurance progress. HAAS-WILSON,
supra note 14, at 2.
16. GETZEN, supra note 4, at 211.
17. Recent studies demonstrate at least 170 million people participate in MCO managed
health care. See NCSL, supra note 2.
18. HASS-WILsON, supra note 14, at 23 (citing Jon Gabel et al., HEALTH AFFAIRS 21
(222): 148, Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy, The Challenge of
Managed Care Regulation: Making Markets Work? (Wash. D.C. August 2001)).
19. The term "Health Maintenance Organization," or "HMO," was coined by Paul El-
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providers who hope the influx of guaranteed patients will offset the reduced
fees. 2' HMOs are more restricted in that when a patient or employee
chooses a provider, he or she is limited. This allows the provider to maintain
22
a precise list of potential patients.
Paul Elwood grouped HMOs into categories-called "models"-
classifying each based on how the type organized the pivoviders. 23 In "staff
model HMOs" the insurance companies employ the physicians directly. The
physicians are salaried.24 "Group model HMOs' are insurance companies
that contract with large physician groups to provide professional services. '' 25
The physicians in the staff and group models often work exclusively for the
HMO.26 Independent Practice Associations (IPAs) are groups of physicians
who want to retain their current practice style and independence. IPAs act as
insurance companies, collecting fixed fees per enrollee and then remitting
payment to IPA members.27
Studies proved that MCOs lowered and controlled costs, owing explic-
itly to the shifting of the cost risk to the providers who, receiving a capped
fee, had interest in controlling procedures to only those deemed necessary.
28
MCOs also control costs through financial incentives awarded to providers
who contain costs. 29 MCOs use utilization review procedures to evaluate
treatment plans for necessity30 and may even result in the denial of certain
treatment after precertification review. MCOs are able to selectively con-
tract for lower rates with a certain limited number of providers who are will-
ing to accept those rates in return for those providers receiving a higher vol-
ume of patients.3' In view of this basic economic principle, the MCO func-
wood who believed that prepayment for services rewarded providers who maintained the
health of their patients because the provider is better off if the patient remains well-if their
health is "maintained." DRANOVE, supra note 5, at 38. By way of contrast-in fee-for-service
plans, the providers benefit more if the patient remains unhealthy. As this article reveals,
however, the MCO type plan actually is more economically feasible if it fails to treat or
denies treatment--sometimes to those who require treatment.
20. Id. For a detailed description of the types of MCOs, see Jonathan P. Weiner &
Gregory de Lissovoy, Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health
Insurance Plans, 18 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 75 (1993).
21. Reece, supra note 12, at 26.
22. Id.
23. DRANOVE, supra note 5, at 68.
24. Id. The early Kaiser model was strictly the staff model. When Kaiser contracted
with the Permanente group it also displayed the group model HMO. Id.
25. Id.
26. See DRANOvE, supra note 5, at 68.
27. Id., at 69.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Wendy Silver, The Inadequacy of State Legislative Responses to ERISA
Preemption of Managed Care Liability, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 845 (2003).
30. Reece, supra note 12, at 31-32; see also Silver, supra note 29, at 852.
31. See Silver, supra note 29, at 851.
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tions as a funnel for a huge supply of patients into a limited demand market,
theoretically driving the price down. Of course, this seemingly anticompeti-
tive or concerted monopoly is economically injurious to providers who re-
fuse to contract for such rates because a large amount of patients participate
in some type of MCO.
32
III. PROTEST AND RESPONSE
Providers outside of the networks began to protest the restrictive con-
tracting. Arguments against the restrictions included limitation on the
choice of providers, burdensome travel times to distant in-network provid-
ers, and the obvious restraint of competition.33
Those providers dissatisfied with this monopolistic control appealed to
the state legislatures, leading to the passage of AWP laws. AWP laws are
statutes requiring a managed care network to accept any physician or non-
physician provider who meets the network's usual selection criteria, who is
willing to be reimbursed at the managed care organization's rates, and who
agrees to the managed care organization's utilization guidelines.34 This
clever line of attack, presented initially through powerful pharmacist lob-
bies, defeated the restrictive MCO construct and became a thorn to MCO
controlled networks.
MCOs, the National Governors' Association, and the United States
Federal Trade Commission 35 fought against AWP legislation, concerned
that they were anticompetitive and would limit their ability to manage qual-
ity and control costs through a limited network. Increased costs would mean
32. Id
33. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, KENTUCKY'S "ANY
WILLING PROVIDER" LAW AND ERISA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
FOR STATE HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION (2003), at http://www.nashp.org
iFiles/GNL51 _ERISA.pdf.
34. These laws come in four categories: (1) Freedom of Choice Laws-requiring insur-
ers to reimburse a non-network provider as long as the provider agrees to accept the insurer's
level of reimbursement for service; (2) Mandatory Admittance Laws-requiring insurers to
include in a network any provider willing to abide by the terms and conditions of the net-
work, including price; (3) Due Process Laws-requiring insurers to follow certain proce-
dures in creating and maintaining a network, such as publishing the criterion for participation
in the network and providing for an appeal process in the event of termination of a provider
from participation in the network; and (4) Essential Community Provider-requiring insurers
to contract with essential community providers serving medically needy populations. See
Gary A. Gransesconi, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws-An Essential
Step Toward National Healthcare Reform, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 227, 230 n. 11 (1995) (citing
Andrew L. Jiranek & Susan D. Baker, Any Willing Provider Laws: Regulating the Health
Care Provider's Contractual Relationship with the Insurance Company, A.B.A. F. HEALTH
L., Winter 1994-95, at 3).
35. BUTLER, supra note 33, at 2.
[Vol. 27
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increased premiums-and a return to the results of the fee-for-service
model.36 Surprisingly, the most obvious means to defeat these AWP statutes
was to attack them via ERISA. The very law designed to protect employees'
rights was now used to defeat those rights provided by statutes. To under-
stand how ERISA was the chosen weapon of attack, one must understand
how ERISA operates in the managed care arena.
IV. ERISA AND ITS IMPACT ON HEALTH CARE LAW
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was enacted
in 1974 to protect employee benefits, however, the law regulates pension
benefits more substantively. Prior to federal regulation, employers often
frustrated the pensioners' right to collect at retirement--either through
mismanagement, company bankruptcy or by characterizing retirement bene-
fits as a conditional gift. 37 ERISA was enacted to protect these benefits. It
contained disclosure and fiduciary responsibilities which gave some trans-
parency to the management of plans and has established other rules to en-
sure security for employees and "recourse if the employer or other fiduciary
violated the rules., 38 The underlying policy is obvious: In these times of
longer lifespans, the government does not want the ever-increasing elderly,
retired population to become wards of the state.39 The Supreme Court has
reiterated this protective purpose on many occasions. 40 ERISA does regulate
health care law, albeit to a much lesser extent, because its coverage extends
to employee welfare benefit plans.4 1 "'[E]mployee welfare benefit plan[s]
36. Id. In fact, industry analyses disagree on whether the AWP laws increase or de-
crease premiums. Id. at n.4.
37. Sharon Reece, The Gilded Gates of Pension Protection: Amending the Anti-
alienation Provision of ERISA Section 206(d), 80 OR. L. REv. 379 (2001).
38. Id. at 382.
39. Id. at 384. ERISA seeks to ensure that employees will not be left empty handed after
employers have guaranteed them certain benefits. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882,
887 (1996). Accordingly, ERISA tries to make certain that pension-fund assets will be ade-
quate to meet expected benefit payments. Id. ERISA's purpose is to ensure that if a worker
has been promised a defined pension benefit upon retirement, and he has fulfilled whatever
conditions are required to obtain a vested benefit, he actually will receive it. Cent. States v.
Cent. Transp., 472 U.S. 559, 569 (1985).
40. ERISA was adopted to provide a uniform set of rules to govern employee benefit
plans including health plans. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 4 (2004). "Congress enacted
ERISA to 'protect... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their benefi-
ciaries' by setting out substantive regulatory requirements for employee benefit plans and 'to
provid[e] for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the [flederal courts."
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.SW. 200, 200 (2004); see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
ERISA is designed to ensure the proper administration of pension and welfare plans both
during the years of active service and in his or her retirement years. Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 839 (1997).
41. Reece, supra note 12, at 20 (citing ERISA's definition of a "welfare benefit plan" as
2005]
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include plans that provide health benefits, [] and fall within the parameters
of ERISA's regulation because HMO's contract with employers to provide
health benefits. 42 This interpretation of ERISA's reach caused ERISA to
effectively embrace health care in America. This probably would not be a
problem if this purpose was originally intended, but the drafters were not
thinking about the legislation's effect on MCOs because the impact of man-
aged care was not foreseeable at the time ERISA was enacted. In fact,
ERISA's embracing of employee health plans is problematic because
ERISA focuses more on retirement security and preempts all laws attempt-
ing to trod on this turf. The by-product of this was the restriction of state
police powers to control health insurance plans.43 ERISA preempts all state
laws "insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan."4 Since the Supreme Court has interpreted "related to" broadly,45 few
follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the
extent that such plan, fmnd, ol prrgmm Was s tsablished IT is mi ,ind fte
purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the pur-
chase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or bene-
fits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemploy-
ment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described
in section 186(c) of this title, other than pensions on retirement or death, and in-
surance to provide such pensions. ERISA § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000)).
42. Reece, supra note 12, at 42; see also Kearney v. United States Healthcare, Inc., 859
F. Supp. 182, 187 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that when Congress drafted the preemption
provision, "it is doubtful that Congress envisioned HMOs operating hospitals, clinics, or
treatment centers and directly providing professional health services by employees or agents
free from tort liability even in the most blatant cases of malpractice where the unfortunate
patients were enrolled by their employers"); Blum v. Harris Methodist Health Plan, Inc., No.
CIV.A.3:97-CV-0374P, 1997 WL 452750, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. July 31, 1997) (holding that
the plaintiff s claim for negligence and medical malpractice is not preempted by federal law
because the claim "only affect[s] the relationship ... as provider-patient, and not as fiduci-
ary-participants"); Schwartz v. FHP Int'l Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1996)
(noting that the HMO was established by the Plaintiff's employer "for the purpose of provid-
ing employees and eligible dependents with medical benefits," establishing, as a matter of
fact, the HMO as an ERISA plan).
43. See ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (providing that the section relates to
"any employee benefit plan described in sectionl003(a)"); see also 139 CONG. REC. H8974
(daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993) (statement of Rep. Dent) (stating that the preemption doctrine is the
"crowning achievement of this legislation," because it would forestall "conflicting and in-
consistent" state laws); John H. Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAw 417 (2000) (stating that "Congress chose to handle explicit preemption under
ERISA by means of an express provision, ERISA §514').
44. 29 U.S.C. §1144(a) (2000). This would include, obviously, statutory and common
law.
45. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 98 (1983) (stating that New York Human
Rights Laws related to the employee benefit plans and stating "a law 'relates to' an employee
[Vol. 27
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state laws that are associated in any way with employee benefits escape the
ERISA umbrella. "Related to" includes any attempt to control benefits,
structure, or administration.
46
V. SAVINGS CLAUSE
ERISA, however, does not totally eviscerate Federalism. Under what is
commonly known as ERISA's "savings provision," state "law[s] .. .which
regulate[] insurance, banking, or securities" are saved from ERISA's pre-
emption.47 The Savings Clause not only allows the states to maintain some
police power over the insurance industry,48 but also reconciles ERISA with
the prior federal law allowing states to regulate insurance, specifically
through the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945. 4
benefit plan... if it has connection with or reference to such plan"); see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (finding that breach of contract actions relate to employee
benefit plans); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (stating that "[s]tate laws
directed toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan but
are not 'saved' because they do not regulate insurance"); Byron Done, Note, Health Care
Reform and ERISA Preemption: Can the States Adopt Aspects of Germany's Health Care
System to Achieve Universal Access and Cost Containment?, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 745, 760 (1995) (explaining how ERISA's "deemer clause" allows employers to avoid
state regulation by opting for self-insurance).
46. Butler, supra note 33, at 3.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). The section's additional deemer clause qualifies
the insurance savings clause by providing that employee benefit plans should not be deemed
insurance companies subject to state law. 29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(B) (2000); see Astrid
Meghrigian, ERISA 's Impact on the Provision of Health Care, 6 HEALTH LAW. 9,10 (Spring
1992) (stating the "result of the preemption provision is that often, employees covered by
self-funded plans are left without an adequate scope of benefits"); see Reece, supra note 12,
at 29 n.79; see also Kearney, 859 F. Supp. at 187 n.6 (explaining that when Congress drafted
the preemption provision, "it is doubtful that Congress envisioned HMOs operating hospi-
tals, clinics or treatment centers and directly providing professional health services by em-
ployees or agents free from tort liability even in the most blatant cases of malpractice where
the unfortunate patients were enrolled by their employers"); Blum, No. CIV.A.3:97-CV-
0374P, 1997 WL 452750, at *3-4 (holding that the plaintiff's claim for negligence and
medical malpractice is not preempted by federal law because the claim "only affect[s] the
relationship . . .as provider-patient, and not as fiduciary-participants"); Schwartz, 947 F.
Supp. at 1358 (noting that the HMO was established by the Plaintiff's employer "for the
purpose of providing employees and eligible dependents with medical benefits," establishing,
as a matter of fact, the HMO as an ERISA plan).
48. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985).
49. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§1011-1015 (2000)). The Act followed the Supreme Court holding in United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which held that the insurance in-
dustry is subject to federal control under the Commerce Clause. In Paul v. Virginia., 75 U.S.
168 (1868), the Supreme Court held that the issuance of an insurance policy was not a trans-
action in commerce. Anthony E. Cascino, Jr., Five Things Every Lawyer Should Know About
Insurance Law, 19 CBA REc. 43 (April 2004). This remained the law for three quarters of a
2005]
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As stated, for a statute to be in a saving relationship with ERISA's pre-
emption rule, it must "regulate insurance., 50 Historically, the determination
of whether an act was saved because it regulated insurance was less
straightforward than whether or not a law was "related to" the plan. The
Supreme Court decision in Group Life and Health Insurance Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.51 used a three-part test to determine whether a practice qualified
as the "business of insurance" under McCarran-Ferguson 52 and conse-
quently saved state insurance regulation from federal preemption. 53 That test
asked (1) whether the practice affected the transfer or spreading of a policy-
holder's risk, (2) whether the practice was an integral part of the. relation-
ship between the insured and the insurer, and (3) whether the practice was
confined to entities within the insurance industry.54
Due to the lack of any other case law directly related to ERISA's sav-
ings clause, the Supreme Court relied on the McCarran-Ferguson test in the
ERISA arena.55 In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,56 the
century until the Court issued its decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass'n., 322 U.S. (1944), which held that congress had the power to regulate insurance. Id.
The near panic that ensued resulted in the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945,
which stated that the industry could be regulated by the individual states. Id "The McCarran
Ferguson Act was intended primarily to preserve state regulation of the insurance industry."
Valerie Witmer, A Patient Perspective: Focusing on Compensating Harm, 13 ANNALS
HEALTH L 589, 594 (2004). The Act reversed that federal power, leaving the only federal
preemption for laws that expressly preempt an area. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Anti-
trust Law: The McCarran-Ferguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 81, 88-89
(1983). For more history, see Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust
Exemption For Insurance: History andPolicy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 587 (1978).
50. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 733.
51. 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979) (holding that third-party provider arrangements between
insurers and pharmacies were not the "business of insurance" under § 2(b) of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act).
52. Id.; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 743.
53. Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject
to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any
law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically
relates to the business of insurance; Provided, that after June 30, 1948, the Act of
July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of October
15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26,
1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall be appli-
cable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law.
59 Stat. 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (2000).
54. See Group Life and Health Ins. Co., 440 U.S. at 205-06; see also Union Labor Life
Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982).
55. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 743; Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 51; Blue
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Supreme Court specifically applied the McCarran-Ferguson three-part test
in the ERISA context, reasoning that ERISA's savings provision, designed
to preserve the McCarran-Ferguson reservation of the business of insurance
for the states, should be subject to the same "business of insurance stan-
dard" in finding if a law "regulates insurance" under ERISA 57. The test,
when interpreting the ERISA savings provision, is called "The Metropolitan
Life Test."'58
VI. AWPS DEEMED INSURANCE OR NOT?
Federal circuits were split on whether AWP laws were preempted by
ERISA or saved by its savings clause. AWP laws were upheld in Virginia,59
Kentucky, 60 and Massachusetts.61 In Louisiana,62 Texas, 63 and Arkansas,64
they were preempted. The Supreme Court had determined that for a statute
to escape preemption under the ERISA savings clause, a state law must be
"specifically directed toward" the insurance industry; laws of general appli-
cation that have some bearing on insurers do not qualify.65 Not all state laws
which were "specifically directed toward" the insurance industry, however,
would be covered under § 1144(b)(2)(A), which saves laws that regulate
insurance, not insurers. As explained in Rush Prudential, insurers must be
regulated "with respect to their insurance practices.'
66
Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas City v. Bell, 798 F.2d 1331, 1335 (10th Cir. 1986).
56. 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985).
57. Id.at 744 n.21.
58. Tingle v. Pac. Mutual Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105, 110 (5th Cir. 1993); Brewer v. Lin-
coln Nat. Life Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 150, 153 (8th Cir. 1990); McMahan v. New England Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co., 888 F.2d 426, 428-30 (6th Cir. 1989); Kelley v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
882 F.2d 453, 456 (10th Cir. 1989); Anschultz v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 850 F.2d 1467,
1468 (1 1th Cir. 1988).
59. Stuart Circle Hosp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993).
60. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Ins. V. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352 (61h Cir. 2000).
61. Am. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 973 F. Supp 60 (D.
Mass. 1997).
62. Cigna Health Plan v. La., 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 1996).
63. Tex. Pharmacy Ass'n. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997)
64. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998).
65. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co.,
481 U.S. at 50); see also Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 366 (2002); FMC
Corp., 498 U.S. at 61.
66. 536 U.S. at 366.
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VII. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT AND THE KENTUCKY AWP LAW
As of late 2004, nearly half of all states had AWP laws.67 Kentucky's
provision stated that "health care benefit plans shall not discriminate against
any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the
health benefit plan and is willing to meet the terms and conditions for par-
ticipation established by the health benefit plan." 6' The Kentucky law pro-
hibited medical insurers, HMOs, from discriminating against providers who
were willing to meet the insurer's conditions for participation. MCOs peti-
tioned in state court on the grounds the law was preempted by ERISA.
Both the district court and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
the law was saved from preemption since the law, as a matter of common-
sense, regulated insurance.69 The lower courts' rationale included the idea
that HMOs were "insurance vehicles" and any regulation of them was regu-
lation of insurance. 70 The Sixth Circuit also determined that under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act's "guide post" test, the AWP statute clearly
"spreads the cost component of the policyholder's risk among all insured,
directly impacts the insurer-insured relationship because it affects restric-
tions on the network of providers available for treatment under the plan, and
applies only to entities within the insurance industry. 71 Proponents of the
law included not only the providers but also the Bush Administration.72
Those seeking to overturn the laws made some.compelling observa-
tions. They argued that MCOs developed and became popular as cost-
cutting organizations. University of Alabama at Birmingham professor Mi-
chael A. Morrisey, PhD noted that AWP statutes increase costs since they
"[cut] the heart out of what managed care tries to do .... Providers who
would have been shut out are better off economically. However, providers
in the network who would have been in a narrower network are worse off
because their patient volume is less. The consumer also pays more."'' Stud-
67. See infra Appendix for a list of the states and their legislation.
68. Nat'l. Conference of State Legislators, Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/Miller.htm.
69. Health Maint. Org. Ass'n of Ky. v. Nichols, No. Civ.A97-24, 1998 WL 34103663
(E.D. Ky. Aug. 6, 1998).
70. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352, 363-72 (6th Cir. 2000).
71. Id.
72. M&S Communications, Supreme Court Upholds HMO 'Any Willing Provider'
Statutes, INSURANCE TIMEs, Vol. XXIII No. 8, April 15, 2003, available at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/pdf/InsuranceTimes_20030415_39111.pdf. The admini-
stration asked the Supreme Court to uphold the Kentucky laws. See also
http://www.osma.org/news/Patients-Physicians-are-winners-in-Supreme-Court-decision.cfm.
73. Tanya Albert, AM News staff, United States Supreme Court weighs any-willing-
provider laws. The high court's roster of medically related concerns also includes a look at
Medicaid drug rebate programs, July 29, 2002. But see BUTLER, supra note 33, at 2 (explain-
ing that industry analysis is unresolved as to the effects of the AWP laws on premiums).
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ies estimate administrative costs could increase by anywhere from thirty-
four to fifty-two percent.74 The Health Insurance Association of America
strongly opposed the AWP statutes and stressed that they would actually
limit competition, "hinder the assurance of high quality care," and increase
costs.75 In litigation, the MCOs argued that AWP statutes did not regulate
insurance because MCOs were not "insurance vehicles" 76 and the MCOs
were not subject to the McCarran-Ferguson Act since their plans control
costs but do not spread the risk or underwrite."
VIII. THE SUPREME COURT EMPOWERS KENTUCKY
It was clear to observers that the Supreme Court, prior to the Miller
case, demonstrated a decisive trend to limit the scope of preemption and to
empower states in traditional areas of local concern.78 ERISA was no longer
viewed in a vacuum but rather was informed by the notion that statutes ex-
ercising the historic police powers of the state should not be preempted
unless that is the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 79 The opportunity
for this seminal decision with regard to AWPs and the evolving preemption
temperament of the Supreme Court was presented when a Kentucky HMO
sued the Commissioner of Kentucky's Department of Insurance to overturn
the AWP provision of the Kentucky Health Care Reform Act 80 under an
ERISA preemption theory. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky granted summary judgment to the State and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed.8'
74. Albert, supra note 73.
75. HIAA Urges Supreme Court to Block "Any Willing Provider,"
www.hiaa.org/news/newsitem.cfm?ContentlD=21772, Jan 14, 2003.
76. Nat'l Conference of State Legislature, supra note 68.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
79. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125 (2004); Rush Prudential HMO, 536 U.S.
355 (2002); Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999); Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Word, 526 U.S. 358 (1999); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Constr., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); id.
80. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A- 270 (West 2001) ("A health insurer shall not
discriminate against any provider who is located within the geographic coverage area of the
health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation
established by the health insurer, including the Kentucky state Medicaid program and Medi-
caid partnerships."); and § 304.17A-171(2) ("health benefit plan that includes chiropractic
benefits shall ... [p]ermit any licensed chiropractor who agrees to abide by the terms, condi-
tions, reimbursement rates, and standards of quality of the health benefit plan to serve as a
participating primary chiropractic provider to any person covered by the plan.").
81. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. at 329.
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In the resulting appeal in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans v. Miller, the
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Kentucky's AWP law escaped
ERISA preemption because it is a law that regulates insurance practices.
82
The Court recognized that the purpose of an MCO's closed network of pro-
viders was to reduce cost and enhance quality control.8 3 In return, the Court
noted that the providers got a monopoly--"patient volume higher than that
achieved by non-network providers who lack access to petitioners' sub-
scribers., 84 The Court explained the obvious concern of the appellant-the
loss of that high volume and the resulting increasing of costs to subscrib-
ers.
85
The Court then discussed the standards of the insurance regulation ex-
ception to ERISA preemption, citing many cases for the idea that for a law
to regulate insurance, it must regulate the industry practices and not simply
be a law of "general application" directed at insurers.86 The appellant HMOs
argued that the Kentucky law did not specifically regulate the insurance
industry because it also restricted providers from entering into networks.87
The Court determined that insurance regulation often affects other entities
and that fact did not place the regulation outside the savings clause. 8 The
Court also negated appellants' argument contending that the regulation did
not actually regulate insurance practices since it focused on the contract
between the HMO and the provider and not the terms of the policies. 89 The
Court differentiated between the limitation on state law preemption under
McCarran-Ferguson, as in Group Life Insurance v. Royal Drug Co., and the
ERISA savings clause.90
The Supreme Court created a new two-part test to decide whether or
not a state law is deemed to regulate insurance: The law must be "specifi-
cally directed toward entities engaged in insurance" and must "substantially
affect the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured." 91
The Court stated:
82. Id.at 342.
83. Id. at 332.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 334. (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 50; see also fush Prudential HMO,
536 U.S. at 366; FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61).
87. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. at 334.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 338.
91. Id. at 342.
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By expanding the number of providers from whom an insured may re-
ceive health services, AWP laws alter the scope of permissible bargains
between insurers and the insureds in a manner similar to ... mandated-
benefit laws .... No longer may Kentucky insureds seek insurance from
a closed network of health care providers in exchange for a lower pre-
mium.
92
Illustrating the difference, the Court noted that a law requiring insur-
ance companies to pay their janitors minimum wage does not regulate in-
surance, although it would "be a prerequisite to engaging in the business of
insurance[] because it does not substantially affect the risk pooling ar-
rangement.,
93
According to the Court's opinion, even self-insured plans may be sub-
ject to AWP laws.94 The Court also clarified a long-time misdirection and
found that McCarran-Ferguson was never essential to examining the ERISA
savings clause. 95 McCarran-Ferguson regulates the business of insurance
versus ERISA's regulation of insurance. The Court stated,
Today we make a clean break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors and
hold that for a state law to be deemed a 'law ... which regulates insur-
ance' under § 1 144(b)(2)(A), it must satisfy two requirements. First, the
state law must be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insur-
ance. Second .... the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured. Kentucky's law satis-
fies each of these requirements.
96
IX. STATE ATTEMPTS
Obviously, states will find drafting of AWP provisions an easier task
post-Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans.97 States merely need to meet the
Miller standard: The law must regulate insurance and alter the scope of
permissible bargains between insurers and insureds in a manner that sub-
stantially affects the risk pooling arrangement. AWP laws inherently satisfy
the second prong and affect the risk pool because they increase the number
92. Id. at 338-39.
93. Ky. Ass 'n of Health Plans, 538 U.S. at 338.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 341
96. Id. at 341-42.
97. See Amanda Gardner, No Fast Changes Seen in High Court Ruling on HMOs Al-
lowing States to Regulate Won't Mean a Stampede of Laws, Experts Say, HEALTH SCOUT
NEws REPORTER, April 4, 2003. New York has not yet passed any statutes, Senate Bill 2823
and Assembly Bill 4439 address participation of laboratories, and Assembly Bill 1915 par-
ticipation of pharmacies. None of the bills have moved from their chamber of origin.
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of providers from whom the insured may receive services. This is specifi-
cally cited in Miller.
A typical AWP provision "requires all health insurers to be ready and
willing at all times to enter into service contracts with all health care pro-
viders who are qualified under state law, who practice within the general
geographic area served by the insurance company, and who are willing to
meet the terms and the conditions set forth by the insurer" 98 To be deemed
an insurance regulation, the statutory language should be directed at control-
ling the insurers by forcing their acceptance of any willing provider instead
of being directed at the providers.
X. DECISION RAMIFICATIONS
Arkansas will be the testing ground to see whether its presently over-
turned AWP law can be revived by Miller.99 The overturned statute first
provides a list of provider practices which it covers. The applicable portion
of the statute is,
(a) A health care insurer shall not, directly or indirectly:
(3) Prohibit or limit a health care provider that is qualified under
23-99-203(d) and is willing to accept the health benefit plan's oper-
ating terms and conditions, schedule of fees, covered expenses, and
utilization regulations and quality standards, from the opportunity to
participate in that plan.
(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a health benefit plan from
instituting measures designed to maintain quality and to control costs,
including, but not limited to, the utilization of a gatekeeper system, as
long as such measurers are imposed equally on all providers in the same
class.1
00
It seems that this statute satisfies the Miller standard because it regulates the
health insurance and alters the scope of permissible bargains between insur-
ers and those insured in a manner that substantially affects the risk pooling
arrangement.
In February 2004 the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas lifted an injunction against the state's AWP law, which
98. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, at www.ncsl.org/statefed/health/AWP
(copy on file with author).
99. The case, Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr Inc. (State of Arkansas)
DC E. Ark, No. LR-C-95-514 (1/31/97); amended (03/17/97), is currently being considered
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
100. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-99-201 (LEXIS Repl. 1995) (see infra Appendix for full
statute).
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required health plans to include within their panels any physician who met
their requirements. 1°' Of course, Arkansas health plans challenged the rul-
ing, insisting that ERISA still preempts the state attempt at defeating the
economic construct. 1 2 The Eighth Circuit is considering the health plans'
requests in light of Miller.10 3 The Arkansas AWP law should not be pre-
empted because it satisfies the Miller criteria for a saving relationship with
ERISA.
More recently, the Arkansas state legislature enacted a new and sup-
posedly improved AWP law by passing Acts 4900°4 and 491105 of the 85th.
Act 490, formerly Senate Bill 43, prohibits health insurers from discriminat-
ing against "any provider who is located within the geographic coverage
area of the health benefit plan and who is willing to meet the terms and con-
ditions for participation established by the health insurer."' 0 6 The Act also
redefines "health insurer" or "health care insurer" to mean, "any entity that
is authorized by the State of Arkansas to offer or provide health benefit
plans, policies, subscriber contracts, or any other contracts of similar nature
which indemnify or compensate health care providers for the provision of
health care services." 0 7 This new definition will expand the number of enti-
ties that fall under the definition and are controlled by the AWP statute. Act
491 provides agency enforcement mechanisms for the mandates in Act 490,
but limits remedies to those provided under ERISA. 10 8 Act 490 will take
effect and repeal Ark. Code Ann. §§ 23-99-201-209, the Patient Protection
Act of 1995 currently being considered by the court, if the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reverses Judge Moody's order and invalidates the 1995
AWP statute. 109 Most of the agency enforcement provisions of Act 491,
however, went into effect upon passage because they are not contingent on
the Eighth Circuit's decision.110 The changes implemented by these two
recently passed acts will make Arkansas' AWP statute more closely resem-
ble the Kentucky statute upheld in Miller.
101. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (State of Arkansas) DC E. Ark, No. LR-C-95-514
(1/31/97); amended (03/17/97).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Act of March 2, 2005, No. 490, 2005 Ark. Acts 490.
105. Act of March 2, 2005, No. 491, 2005 Ark. Acts 491.
106. Id. at sec 1.
107. Id.
108. See 2005 Ark. Acts 491.
109. 2005 Ark. Acts 490. Section 2 states in pertinent part that "[t]his act shall become
effective only if the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Prudential Insurance Co., et al. V.
HMO Partners, Inc., et al., U.S.C.A, No. 04-1465/04-1644, does not order the injunction
against enforcement of the Patient Protection Act of 1995 lifted as to health insurers of pri-
vate, insured ERISA plans."
110. 2005 Ark. Acts 491.
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The legislative response, before the resolution of the issue by the judi-
ciary, sends a clear message that the Arkansas Legislature overwhelmingly
supports AWP statutes and will continue to seek to mold Arkansas law into
compliance with whatever specifications the courts impose on such statutes.
The Court's ruling in Kentucky is vital to the determination of a state's
AWP laws, although "it is another loss for the HMO industry, which has
continuously sought to use ERISA as a sword to reign in litigation, instead
of a shield to protect employees, as was the original intent of the statute."''
Any state that drafts an appropriate AWP law can require MCOs to admit
anyone meeting provider qualifications if the AWP law is drafted to satisfy
the Miller standard. Thus, the ability of MCOs to limit the number of pro-
viders and contract limited and exclusive relationships with only certain
providers, will be curtailed. MCOs cannot, therefore, rely on cost contain-
ment for rate and patient volume discounts."12 MCOs administrative costs
are expected to increase due to the need for greater resources to administer a
network of indeterminable size." 3 MCOs will also no longer be able to in-
cude only select providers in their network unless their provider qualifica-
tions contain extremely discriminating provisions. 4 These results could
affect the costs to the enrollees." 5
For the providers, the Supreme Court's decision awards them the free-
dom to practice-the freedom to practice is what proponents of the AWP
laws argued that MCOs were actively restricting. Essentially, the general
practice of MCOs is a monopoly of sorts, restricting access of patients to
only certain practitioners. The restriction, costumed as freedom to contract,
seems to violate the spirit of antitrust policies. The freedom of states to open
the gates through AWP laws has restored competition in the capitalist mar-
ket. Some analysts, however, determined AWP legislation is and has always
been really a "toothless tiger," 16 and the lack of state remedial provisions
seems to support this idea.
The United States Supreme Court again addressed the Savings Clause
in the 2004 case of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila' 17 and maintained its long-
standing interpretation that a claim for denial of benefits is preempted on
111. Sara Hoffman Jurand, High Court Ruling on ERISA Is Another Blow to HMOs, 39
TRIAL 17 (June 2003) (quoting attorney Joshua Spielberg).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Daly D.E. Temchirie, The Supreme Court Has Spoken on "Any Willing Pro-
vider" State Laws: The Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller Decision,
EBsTErN, BECKER & GREEN: ALVRTS, April 7, 2003, at www.ebglaw.com/article_795.htm.
115. Hoffman Jurand, supra note 111, at 17.
116. David L. Coleman, "'Any Willing Provider": A Toothless Tiger?, MANAGED CARE
MAGAZINE (1996), at www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9604/Mc9604.awp.shtml.
117. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
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the grounds that ERISA provides a remedy for denials of benefits.'18 Davila
represents a consolidation of cases in which the respondents, Juan Davila
and Ruby Calad, suffered injuries that they alleged resulted from decisions
by their respective health care providers to withhold coverage for services
and treatments recommended by their treating physicians119 The respon-
dents each brought suits in Texas state court invoking the Texas Health
Care Liability Act (THCLA).' 20 The petitioners removed the cases to fed-
eral court arguing that ERISA preempted the respondents' claims. 12' The
individual district courts each agreed that ERISA controlled and dismissed
when the respondents failed to amend their complaints to bring explicit
ERISA claims. 22 Repondents appealed, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated their cases to determine the propriety
of the denials of the motions to remand. 23 The court of appeals found that
the respondents' claims did not fall within section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA
and that the denials of the motions to remand were improper. 24 The MCOs
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
125
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals,
holding that ERISA completely pre-empted the respondents' causes of ac-
tion. 126 The Court reasoned that the decision to grant or deny benefits under
an ERISA-regulated benefit plan falls within the scope of ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) and is governed by federal law. 127 In writing for the unanimous
court, Justice Thomas did not cite Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, leading
some commentators to speculate that the new analysis for Savings Clause
cases employed by the Court in Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans may be of
limited use in future ERISA cases.
128
The Court emphasized that state-law causes of action duplicating or
supplanting the civil enforcement remedy ERISA provides are contrary to
the legislative intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive. 29 Justice Tho-
mas elaborated by stating that the Congressional policy determination to
118. Seeid.
119. Idat 2493.
120. Id. The THCLA imposes a "duty to exercise ordinary care when making health care
treatment decisions." Id.
121. Davila, 542 U.S. at 200.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Davila, 542 U.S. at 201.
128. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Troyen A. Brennan, The Swinging Pendulum: The Supreme
Court Reverses Course on ERISA and Managed Care, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. &
ETHics 451, 461 (2005).
129. Id. at 2495.
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allow some remedies and exclude others would be frustrated if states were
free to allow alternate remedies under state law. 130 Justice Thomas also
noted,
As this Court has recognized in both Rush Prudential and Pilot Life,
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A) must be interpreted in light of the congressional
intent to create an exclusive federal remedy in ERISA § 502(a). Under
ordinary principles of conflict pre-emption, then, even a state law that
can arguably be characterized as "regulating insurance" will be pre-
empted if it provides a separate vehicle to assert a claim for benefits out-
side of, or in addition to, ERISA's remedial scheme.'
31
State AWP statutes, consequently, should seek to avoid providing ad-
ditional remedies not contemplated by ERISA in order to avoid preemption.
The recent changes to the Arkansas law are designed in accordance with
this analysis and state that civil remedies are provided "to the extent permit-
ted by ERISA."'
13 2
XI. CONCLUSION: FUNNEL TO A SIEVE
At this time, the Supreme Court, by upholding the AWP law, has
opened the flow of patients to willing providers and has empowered states
to legislate in this area. States could extend this Supreme Court treatment to
other attempts at legislating the conduct of MCOs in the area of standards of
care. 133 Of course, others are concerned that this balkanization will defeat
any contemplated national health policy.' 
34
Arkansas Attorney General Mike Beebe is confident: "I know that the
legal fight over this law is not over. However, with the strength of our posi-
tion reinforced by Judge Moody's order, I'm encouraged that our any-
willing-provider law will withstand any continued legal challenges. '3 5
Economically, no statistics absolutely prove that AWP laws will increase
premiums to those insured. 3 6 In fact, the AWP laws may be the panacea for
the one economically questionable aspect of managed care. Managed care
was a means to reduce the cost of healthcare resulting from the fee-for-
130. Id. at 2500.
131. Id.
132. Ark. Acts 491 at sec 1.
133. Of course, one should not ignore the larger picture: The Supreme Court has made a
decision to uphold Federalism. This trend is something to be watched, obviously.
134. Gary A. Francesconi, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider" Laws-An
Essential Step Toward National Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L. Q. 227 (1995).
135. Tanya Talbert, Injuliction Lifted Against A WP Law, AMEDNEWS.COM, at
www.ama-assn-org/amednews/2004/03/15/gvsc0315.htm (March 15, 2004).
136. See BUTLER, supra note 33.
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service system. Managed care not only spread the risk among insureds,
thereby lowering the cost to those insureds, but also provided oversight for
treatment necessity and provider skill. AWP laws include provisions that
require those willing providers to maintain certain qualifications and stan-
dards of care. Therefore, the oversight should not be sacrificed.
The only true sacrifice will be for the providers who are used to the
convenient managed care funnel of patients forced to use their services.
This funnel is a cleverly disguised monopoly and cannot really serve the
customer. Managed care has forced the patient to seek services from,
maybe, a provider he or she does not care to patronize. Although the compe-
tition created by the AWP sieve--driving the same patients to more provid-
ers-will not drive costs down because contracted rates will, in all likeli-
hood, remain the same, opening up the market to any provider willing to
maintain the managed care organization's requirements will result in com-
petition for quality. Sounds like a good thing for all concerned.
APPENDIX
The statutes are classified by the broadness of their application.
A. Pharmacist Specific Statutes
The following states have statutes that appear to satisfy the Miller
Standard because they all, as stated above, affect the risk pool and regulate
the insurance industry: Alabama, 37 Connecticut,13 8 Delaware,13 9 Indiana, 4 °Masacusets141 • . . •. 142
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, 143 New Jersey, 1" North
Carolina, 145 North Dakota, 146 Oklahoma, 147 and South Carolina. 14 8 Louisi-
ana's 149 attempted AWP law was overturned, although it appears to satisfy
137. ALA. CODE § 27-45-3 (1975).
138. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 38a-471(f) (West 2000).
139. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7303(b) (1994).
140. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-11-3(b)-(c) (West 2005).
141. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, 3(B)(5) (West 2005).
142. Miss. CODE ANN. § 83-401-417 (1995).
143. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420-B:12(V) (1998) (While not as strict as other AWP
statutes, this statute still regulates the insurance industry in forcing health maintenance or-
ganizations to list all pharmacies that meet the acceptable bids. Therefore, this law also
passed the first prong of Miller).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4-7(a)(2) (West 2005).
145. N.C. GEN. STAT. 58-51-37(b)(2) (1993).
146. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-36-12.2(l)(c) (2003).
147. OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 36, § 3634.3 (West 2005).
148. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-147 (Law. Co-op. 2004).
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214(15)(a)(ii) (West 2005); Cigna Health Plan of La.,
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the Miller standard. Louisiana may reconsider its law and escape appeal to
the federal courts in lieu of satisfying Miller. Florida's15 ° AWP law was
repealed in October of 2000.
1. ALA. CODE 27-45-3 (1975). Choice ofpharmaceutical services;
right to participate as contracting provider.
No health insurance policy or employee benefit plan which is deliv-
ered, renewed, issued for delivery, or otherwise contracted for in this state
shall:
(1) Prevent any person who is a party to or beneficiary of any such
health insurance policy or employee benefit plan from selecting the
pharmacy or pharmacist of his choice to furnish the pharmaceutical ser-
vices, including without limitation, prescription drugs, offered by said
policy or plan or interfere with said selection provided the pharmacy or
pharmacist is licensed to furnish such pharmaceutical services in this
state; or
(2) Deny any pharmacy or pharmacist the right to participate as a con-
tracting provider for such policy or plan provided the pharmacist is li-
censed to furnish pharmaceutical services, including without limitation,
prescription drugs offered by said policy or plan.
2. CON GEN. STAT. ANN. ' 38a-471 (West 2000). Third party pre-
scription prograns. Notice of cancellation. Applicability of sec-
tion.
(a) As used in this section, a "third party prescription program" means a
system of providing for reimbursement for the cost of drugs or pharma-
ceutical services under a contractual arrangement or agreement with a
provider of such drugs or services. Such programs shall include, but not
be limited to, employee benefit plans under which a consumer receives
prescription drugs or pharmaceutical services and such drugs or services
are paid for in part by an agent of the consumer's employer or others.
An "administrator" means the program administrator of a third party
prescription program.
(b) Any agreement or contract entered into in this state between an ad-
ministrator and a pharmacy shall include a statement of the method and
amount of reimbursement to the pharmacy for drugs or services pro-
Inc. v. La., 82 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 196); Murphy vs. Cmty. Health Network of La., 712 So. 2d
296 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
150. FLA. STAT. ANN § 408.706(10) (West 2005) (repealed Oct. 1, 2000).
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vided to persons enrolled in the program, and the frequency of payment
by the administrator to the pharmacy for such drugs or services.
(c) (1) Each administrator of a program shall notify all pharmacies en-
rolled in such program of any cancellation of coverage or benefits of any
group enrolled in the program at least thirty days prior to the effective
date of such cancellation or, within ten business days following the date
on which he receives notice of a cancellation, if he receives such notice
less than forty days prior to its effective date.
(2) Each employer shall give written notice to all persons enrolled
in such program of the cancellation of the plan and written notice to
any person whose enrollment is terminated. Such notice shall be
given as soon as is practicable but in no case later than thirty days
after cancellation or termination. Such notice shall include a de-
mand for the return of any plan identification cards such persons
may have been issued by reason of their enrollment in such pro-
gram.
(3) Any person who uses a program identification card to obtain
drugs or services from a pharmacy after having received notice of
the cancellation of his program shall be liable to the administrator
for all moneys paid by the administrator for any drugs or services
obtained by the illegal use of such card.
(d) (1) No administrator shall deny payment to any pharmacy for drugs
or services which were provided as the result of the fraudulent or illegal
use of an identification card by any person to whom an identification
card was issued, unless the pharmacy was notified of the cancellation of
such card.
(2) No administrator shall withhold payments for uncontested
claims to any pharmacy beyond the time period specified in the
payment schedule provisions of the agreement.
(e) Each administrator shall mail to any pharmacist, upon written re-
quest, a copy of each contract or agreement form in use in this state be-
tween such administrator and a pharmacy.
(f) No administrator shall prohibit a pharmacy from enrolling in a pro-
gram except for cause, including, but not limited to, previous fraudulent
use of program identification cards.
(g) The provisions of this section shall not apply to the providing of
drugs or services under the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act.
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3. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7303 (1994). Access and prohibitions.
(a) Any person in the State may select the pharmacy of the person's
choice as long as the pharmacy has agreed to participate in the plan ac-
cording to the terms offered by the insurer.
(b) Any pharmacy or pharmacist has the right to participate as a contract
provider under a plan or policy if the pharmacy or pharmacist agrees to
accept the terms and reimbursement set forth by the insurer.
(c) No insurer shall impose on a beneficiary any co-payment or condi-
tion that is not equally imposed with all contracting pharmacy providers
the beneficiary may utilize.
(d) No insurer shall require a beneficiary, as a condition of payment or
reimbursement, to purchase pharmacy services, including prescription
drugs, exclusively through a mail-order pharmacy.
(e) A pharmacist or pharmacy shall not interfere with 'the control of
over-utilization of a plan's covered services and may not waive, dis-
count, rebate or distort in any way the designated co-payment of any in-
surer plan or patient's co-insurance portion of a prescription drug cover-
age plan.
(f) At least 60 days prior to the effective date of any health benefit plan
or renewal of any pharmacy contract network which provides for cover-
age of pharmacy services, including prescription drug coverage, to
Delaware residents, and restricts pharmacy participation, the entity pro-
viding the health benefit plan shall provide notice to all pharmacies
within the State and shall offer to the pharmacies the opportunity to par-
ticipate in the heatth benefit ptan. Such notice and offer shatt be cons id-
ered given upon delivery of written notice to the Delaware Pharmaceuti-
cal Society, Inc. or its successor, and upon publication of such notice in
a newspaper of general circulation throughout the State. All pharmacies
within the State shall be eligible to participate under identical reim-
bursement terms for providing pharmacy services, including prescription
drugs. The health benefit insurer shall inform the plan beneficiaries of
the names and locations of pharmacies that are participating in the plan
as providers of pharmacy services.
(g) Any provision in a health benefit plan which is executed, delivered
or renewed, or otherwise contracted for in this State that is contrary to
any provision of this section shall, to the extent of the conflict, be void.
(h) It shall be a violation of this section for any insurer of any person to
provide any health benefit plan that provides for pharmaceutical services
to residents of this State that does not conform to the provisions of this
section.
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4. IND. CODE ANN. . 27-8-11-3 (West 2005). Reimbursement agree-
ments; immunity.
Sec. 3.
(a) An insurer may:
(1) enter into agreements with providers relating to terms and con-
ditions of reimbursement for health care services that may be ren-
dered to insureds of the insurer, including agreements relating to the
amounts to be charged the insured for services rendered or the terms
and conditions for activities intended to reduce inappropriate care;
(2) issue or administer policies in this state that include incentives
for the insured to utilize the services of a provider that has entered
into an agreement with the insurer under subdivision (1); and
(3) issue or administer policies in this state that provide for reim-
bursement for expenses of health care services only if the services
have been Tendered by a provider that has entered into an agreement
with the insurer under subdivision (1).
(b) Before entering into any agreement under subsection (a)(1), an in-
surer shall establish terms and conditions that must be met by providers
wishing to enter into an agreement with the insurer under subsection
(a)(1). These terms and conditions may not discriminate unreasonably
against or among providers. For the purposes of this subsection, neither
differences in prices among hospitals or other institutional providers
produced by a process of individual negotiation nor price difference
among other providers in different geographical areas or different spe-
cialties constitutes unreasonable discrimination. Upon request by a pro-
vider seeking to enter into an agreement with an insurer under subsec-
tion (a)(1), the insurer shall make available to the provider a written
statement of the terms and conditions that must be met by providers
wishing to enter into an agreement with the insurer under subsection
(a)(1).
(c) No hospital, physician, pharmacist, or other provider designated in..
• willing to meet the terms and conditions of agreements described in
this section may be denied the right to enter into an agreement under
subsection (a)(1). When an insurer denies a provider the right to enter
into an agreement with the insurer under subsection (a)(1) on the
grounds that the provider does not satisfy the terms and conditions es-
tablished by the insurer for providers entering into agreements with the
insurer, the insurer shall provide the provider with a written notice that:
(1) explains the basis of the insurer's denial; and
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(2) states the specific terms and conditions that the provider, in the
opinion of the insurer, does not satisfy.
(d) In no event may an insurer deny or limit reimbursement to an insured
under this chapter on the grounds that the insured was not referred to the
provider by a person acting on behalf of or under an agreement with the
insurer.
5. MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 176D, ,' 3B(5) (West 2005). Requirements
for carriers offering pharmacy networks; arrangements between
carriers and non-networkpharmacies," definitions.
A carrier that offers insureds a restricted pharmacy network shall, in
soliciting, arranging, competitively bidding and contracting for such a net-
work, comply with the following requirements for the purpose of promoting
fair and competitive bidding:
(5) open all bids (a) at a previously specified time, which shall not be
more than thirty days after the bid submission deadline, and (b) in a pub-
lic manner, provided that certain information contained in said bids may
be held as confidential from public review consistent with regulations
promulgated by the commissioner regarding the disclosure of proprie-
tary data or information submitted by any bidders.
A carrier shall neither exclude nor favor any individual pharmacy, or
group or class of pharmacies, in the design of a competitive bid involving
restricted or nonrestricted pharmacy networks in compliance with the re-
quirements of this section. An entity that assists a carrier in the development
or management of said design, network contracts, bid specifications or the
bid process, or assists in the review or evaluation of said bids, shall be pro-
hibited from bidding on such a contact.
A retail pharmacy registered pursuant to sections thirty-eight and
thirty-nine of chapter one hundred twelve, or an association of such phar-
macies whose purpose is to promote participation in restricted pharmacy
networks, which are not offered or are not participating in a carrier's re-
stricted pharmacy network contract shall nevertheless have the right to pro-
vide drug benefits to the carrier's insureds provided that such non-network
pharmacies reach the following agreements with the carrier:
(1) to accept as the carrier's payment in full the lowest price required of
any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted pharmacy network;
(2) to bill to the insured up to and not in excess of any copayment, coin-
surance, deductible or other amount required of an insured by the car-
rier;
[Vol. 27
PUNCTURING THE FUNNEL
(3) to be reimbursed on the same methodological basis, including, but
not limited to capitation or other risk-sharing methodology, as required
of any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted pharmacy network;
(4) to participate in the carrier's utilization review and quality assurance
programs, including utilization and drug management reports as required
of any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted pharmacy network;
(5) to provide computerized on-line eligibility determinations and claims
submissions as required of any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted
pharmacy network;
(6) to participate in the carrier's satisfaction surveys and complaint reso-
lution programs for its insureds;
(7) to protect the carrier's proprietary information and an insured's con-
fidentiality and privacy;
(8) to abide by the carrier's performance standards with respect to wait-
ing times, fill rates and inventory management, including formulary re-
strictions;
(9) to comply with the carrier's claims audit provisions; and
(10) to certify, using audit results or accountant statements, the fiscal
soundness of the non-network pharmacy.
A carrier may waive any of the aforementioned agreements in arrang-
ing for the provision of pharmaceutical drug benefits to insureds through a
non-network pharmacy. A carrier may impose a cost-sharing charge for the
use of a non-network pharmacy not to exceed five percent more than the
charge for using any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted pharmacy network.
A carrier shall not impose any agreements, terms or conditions on any non-
network pharmacy, or on any association of pharmacies, which are more
restrictive than those required of any pharmacy in the carrier's restricted
pharmacy network. The failure of a non-network pharmacy to abide by the
aforementioned agreements may, at the option of the carrier, serve as the
basis for cancellation of the non-network pharmacy's participation agree-
ment.
The provisions of this section shall not apply to arrangements for the
provision of pharmaceutical drug benefits to insureds between a carrier and
a mail order pharmacy, a hospital-based pharmacy which is not a retail
pharmacy, a pharmacy maintained by a physician group practice or clinic
which is not a retail pharmacy or a pharmacy wholly-owned by a carrier.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to require or preclude the
provision of pharmacy services to insureds through a restricted pharmacy
network nor any other arrangement for the provision of prescription drug
benefits.
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The provisions of this section shall not apply to the establishment of
any restricted pharmacy network in a geographical area, approved by the
commissioner, which is served solely by a single provider of pharmaceutical
services.
For purposes of this section, the term "carrier" shall mean an insurer
operating pursuant to the provisions of chapter one hundred and seventy-
five, a hospital service corporation operating pursuant to the provisions of
chapter one hundred and seventy-six A, a medical service corporation oper-
ating pursuant to the provisions of chapter one hundred and seventy-six B, a
health maintenance organization operating pursuant to the provisions of
chapter one hundred and seventy-six G, and a preferred provider arrange-
ment operating pursuant to the provisions of chapter one hundred and sev-
enty-six I, or a wholly-owned subsidiary or affiliate under common owner-
ship thereof. The term "insured" shall mean a person whose health care ser-
vices and benefits are provided by, or indemnified by or otherwise covered
by a carrier's group or individual insurance policy, or certificate, agreement
or contract and shall include subscribers, enrollees or members. The term
"eligible bidder" shall mean a retail pharmacy, community pharmacy or
pharmacy department registered pursuant to sections thirty-eight and thirty-
nine of chapter one hundred and twelve, irrespective of corporate structure
or number of locations at which it conducts business, located within the
geographical service area of a carrier and willing to bid for participation in a
restricted pharmacy network contract. The term "restricted pharmacy net-
work" shall mean an arrangement for the provision of pharmaceutical drug
benefits to insureds which under the terms of a carrier's policy, certificate,
contract or agreement of insurance or coverage requires an insured or cre-
ates a financial incentive for an insured to obtain prescription drug benefits
from one or more participating pharmacies that have entered into, a specific
contractual relationship with the carrier pursuant to a competitive bidding
process.
The commissioner of the division of insurance shall have authority to
enforce the provisions of this section.
6. MISS. CODEANN. , 83-41-417 (1995). Opportunities to apply for
participation.
A health maintenance organization as defined in Section 83-41-303,
and a managed care entity as defined in Section 83-41-403, shall establish
procedures to give interested health care providers located in the geographic
area served an opportunity to apply for participation.
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7. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ' 420-B:12 (1998). Prohibited Practices.
I. No health maintenance organization, or representative thereof, may
cause or knowingly permit the use of advertising which is untrue or mis-
leading, solicitation which is untrue or misleading, or any form of evidence
of coverage which is deceptive. For purposes of this chapter:
(a) A statement or item of information shall be deemed to be untrue if it
does not conform to fact in any respect which is or may be significant to
an enrolled participant of, or person considering enrolling in, a health
maintenance organization;
(b) A statement or item of information shall be deemed to be misleading,
whether or not it may be literally true, if, in the total context in which
such statement is made or such item of information is communicated,
such statement or item of information reasonably may be understood by
a reasonable person, not possessing special knowledge regarding health
care coverage, as indicating any benefit or advantage or the absence of
any exclusion, limitation, or disadvantage of possible significance to an
enrolled participant of, or person considering enrollment in, a health care
plan, if such benefit or advantage or absence of limitation, exclusion or
disadvantage does not in fact exist;
(c) An evidence of coverage shall be deemed to be deceptive if the evi-
dence of coverage taken as a whole, and with consideration given to ty-
pography and format, as well as language, shall be such as to cause a
reasonable person, not possessing special knowledge regarding health
care plans or evidences of coverage therefor [sic], to expect benefits,
services, charges, or other advantages which the evidence of coverage
does not provide or which the health care plan issuing such evidence of
coverage does not regularly make available for enrolled participants
covered under such evidence of coverage.
II. RSA 406-A and RSA 417 shall be construed to apply to health
maintenance organizations and evidences of coverage, except to the extent
that the commissioner determines that the nature of the health maintenance
organizations, and evidences of coverage render such statutes inappropriate.
III. No health maintenance organization, unless licensed as an insurer,
may use in its name, evidences of coverage, contracts, or literature, any of
the words "insurance," "casualty," "surety," "mutual," or any other words
descriptive of the insurance, casualty, or surety business or deceptively
similar to the name or description of any insurance or surety corporation
doing business in this state.
IV. No health maintenance organization shall exclude part-time em-
ployees or refuse to offer the same insurance benefits to part-time employ-
ees as it offers to the employee groups of which the part-time employees
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would be members if they were full-time employees. The insurer shall offer
to include the part-time employees as part of the employer's employee
group, at the full rate to be paid by the employer, at a rate prorated between
the employer and the employee, or at the employee's expense. A part-time
employee shall be any employee who regularly works at least half of the
weekly hours of the full-time employee in the employee group of which the
part-time employee would be a member if he were a full-time employee, but
who works a minimum of at least 15 hours per week.
V. Every health maintenance organization which solicits bids from
pharmacies for contracts to be preferred providers shall accept and list as
preferred providers all pharmacies which meet the bid acceptable to the
health maintenance organization.
VI. No health maintenance organization shall, when issuing or renew-
ing a policy or contract of insurance or any certificate under such policy or
contract covered by this chapter, deny coverage or limit coverage to any
resident of this state on the basis of health risk or condition except that a
waiting period consistent with insurance department rules may be imposed
for pre-existing medical conditions. If a health maintenance organization
accepts an application for group coverage, such acceptance shall be subject
to the following:
(a) If the group has coverage in effect through another plan, the health
maintenance organization shall accept all persons covered under the ex-
isting plan. If the group does not have coverage in effect through another
plan, the health maintenance organization shall accept all persons for
which the group seeks coverage.
(b) Once a group policy has been issued, any person becoming eligible
for coverage shall become covered by enrolling within 31 days after first
becoming eligible. Any person so enrolling shall not be required to sub-
mit evidence of insurability based on medical conditions. If a person
does not enroll at this time, he is a late enrollee.
(c) Once a group policy has been issued, the health maintenance organi-
zation shall provide the group with an annual open enrollment period for
late enrollees. During the open enrollment period, any late enrollee shall
be permitted to enroll without submitting any evidence of insurability
based on medical conditions. For late enrollees only, the pre-existing
condition provisions shall apply for 18 months form the date of enroll-
ment.
VII. An insurer issuing policies of group insurance shall allocate the
costs associated with maternity and childbirth over both males and females
covered by its entire block of business in this state. In cases in which, be-
cause of the amount written in the state, allocation to an entire block of
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business needs to occur, the carrier may apply for a waiver from the insur-
ance commissioner.
8. N.J. STAT. ANN.. 26:2J-4. 7 (West 2005). Issuance or continuation
of health maintenance organizations providing pharmacy ser-
vices, prescription drugs, or prescription drug plans; conditions.
(a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a certificate of
authority to establish and operate a health maintenance organization in
this State shall not be issued or continued on or after the effective date of
this act for a health maintenance organization which provides pharmacy
services, prescription drugs, or a prescription drug plan, unless the cov-
erage for health care services:
(1) Permits the enrollee, at the time of enrollment, to select benefit
coverage allowing the enrollee to choose a pharmacy or pharmacist
for the provision of prescription drugs or pharmacy services, pro-
vided that any pharmacist or pharmacy selected by the enrollee is
registered pursuant to ... et seq.;
(2) Provides that no pharmacy or pharmacist shall be denied the
right to participate as a preferred provider or as a contracting pro-
vider, under the same terms and conditions currently applicable to
all other preferred or contacting providers, if the health maintenance
organization provides for coverage by contracted or preferred pro-
viders for pharmaceutical services, provided the pharmacy or phar-
macist is registered pursuant to . . . et seq., and accepts the terms
and conditions of the health maintenance organization;
(3) Provides that no copayment, fee, or other condition shall be im-
posed upon an enrollee selecting a participating or contracting phar-
macist or pharmacy that is not also equally imposed upon all enrol-
lees selecting a participating or contracting pharmacist or phar-
macy;
(4)(a) Provides that no enrollee shall be required to obtain phar-
macy services and prescription drugs from a mail service pharmacy;
(b) Provides for no differential in any copayment applicable to any pre-
scription drug of the same strength, quantity and days' supply, whether
obtained from a mail service pharmacy or a non-mail service pharmacy,
provided that the non-mail service pharmacy agrees to the same terms,
conditions, price and services applicable to the mail service pharmacy;
and
(c) Provides that the limit on days' supply is the same whether the pre-
scription drug is obtained from a mail service pharmacy or a non- mail
[sic] service pharmacy, and that the limit shall not be less than 90 days
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except for any health care-related programs funded in whole or in part
with State funds, including, but not limited to, the Medicaid program es-
tablished pursuant to P.L. 1968, c. 413 (C.30:4D-1 et seq.) and the
"Children's Health Care Coverage Program" established pursuant to
P.L. 1997, c. 272 (C.30:41-1 et seq.);
(5) Sets forth the auditing procedures to be used by the health main-
tenance organization and includes a provision that any audit shall
take place at a time mutually agreeable to the pharmacy or pharma-
cist and the auditor, unless authorized by the Division of Medical
Assistance and Health Services in the Department of Human Ser-
vices with regard to any health care-related programs funded in
whole or in part with State funds, including, but not limited to, the
Medicaid program and "Children's Health Care Coverage Pro-
gram". No audit by a health maintenance organization shall include
a review of any document relating to any person or prescription
plan other than those reimbursable by the health maintenance or-
ganization, unless authorized by the Division of Medical Assistance
and Health Services in the Department of Human Services with re-
gard to any health care-related programs funded in whole or in part
with State funds, including, but not limited to, the Medicaid pro-
gram and "Children's Health Care Coverage Program";
(6) Provides that the health maintenance organization, or any agent
or intermediary thereof, including a third party administrator, shall
not restrict or prohibit, directly or indirectly, a pharmacy from
charging the enrollee for services rendered by the pharmacy that are
in addition to charges for the drug, for dispensing the drug or for
prescription counseling. Services rendered by the pharmacy for
which additional charges are imposed shall be subject to the ap-
proval of the Board of Pharmacy. A pharmacy shall disclose to the
purchaser the charges for the additional services and the purchaser's
out-of-pocket cost for those services prior to dispensing the drug. A
pharmacy shall not impose any additional charges for patient coun-
seling or for other services required by the Board of Pharmacy or
the Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services in the De-
partment of Human Services or State or federal law;
(7) The provisions of P.L. 1999, c. 395 shall apply to all health
maintenance organization contracts delivered. [sic] issued or re-
newed on or after the effective date of P.L. 1999, c. 395.
b. Nothing in this section shall be construed to operate to add any cover-
age for health care services, to increase the scope of any coverage for
health care services, or to increase the level of any health care services
provided by a health maintenance organization.
c. This section shall apply to health maintenance organization plans in
which the right to change the enrollee charge has been reserved.
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9. N.C. GEN. STA T. $ 58-51-3 7 (1993). Pharmacy of choice.
(a) This section shall apply to all health benefit plans providing pharma-
ceutical services benefits, including prescription drugs, to any resident
of North Carolina. This section shall also apply to insurance companies
and health maintenance organizations that provide or administer cover-
ages and benefits for prescription drugs. This section shall not apply to
any entity that has its own facility, employs or contracts with physicians,
pharmacists, nurses, and other health care personnel, and that dispenses
prescription drugs from its own pharmacy to its employees and to enrol-
lees of its health benefit plan; provided, however, this section shall apply
to an entity otherwise excluded that contracts with an outside pharmacy
or group of pharmacies to provide prescription drugs and services. This
section shall not apply to any federal program, clinical trial program,
hospital or other health care facility licensed pursuant to Chapter 131E
or Chapter 122C of the General Statutes, when dispensing prescription
drugs to its patients.
(b) As used in this section:
(1) "Copayment" means a type of cost sharing whereby insured or
covered persons pay a specified predetermined amount per unit of
service with their insurer paying the remainder of the charge. The
copayment is incurred at the time the service is used. The copay-
ment may be a fixed or variable amount.
(2) "Contract provider" means a pharmacy granted the right to pro-
vide prescription drugs and pharmacy services according to the
terms of the insurer.
(3) "Health benefit plan" is as that term is defined in G.S. 58-50-
110(11).
(4) "Insurer" means any entity that provides or offers a health bene-
fit plan.
(5) "Pharmacy" means a pharmacy registered with the North Caro-
lina Board of Pharmacy.
(c ) The terms of a health benefit plan shall not:
(1) Prohibit or limit a resident of this State, who is eligible for re-
imbursement for pharmacy services as a participant or beneficiary
of a health benefit plan, ftom selecting a pharmacy of his or her
choice when the pharmacy has agreed to participate in the health
benefit plan according to the terms offered by the insurer;
(2) Deny a pharmacy the opportunity to participate as a contract
provider under a health benefit plan if the pharmacy agrees to pro-
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vide pharmacy services that meet the terms and requirements, in-
cluding terms of reimbursement, of the insurer under a health bene-
fit plan, provided that if the pharmacy is offered the opportunity to
participate, it must participate or no provisions of G.S. 58-51-37
shall apply;
(3) Impose upon a beneficiary of pharmacy services under a health
benefit plan any copayment, fee, or condition that is not equally im-
posed upon all beneficiaries in the same benefit category, class, or
copayment level under the health benefit plan when receiving ser-
vices from a contract provider;
(4) Impose a monetary advantage or penalty under a health benefit
plan that would affect a beneficiary's choice of pharmacy. Mone-
tary advantage or penalty includes higher copayment, a reduction in
reimbursement for services, or promotion of one participating
pharmacy over another by these methods.
(5) Reduce allowable reimbursement for pharmacy services to a
beneficiary under a health benefit plan because the beneficiary se-
lects a pharmacy of his or her choice, so long as that pharmacy has
enrolled with the health benefit plan under the terms offered to all
pharmacies in the plan coverage area; or
(6) Require a beneficiary, as a condition of payment or reimburse-
ment, to purchase pharmacy services, including prescription drugs,
exclusively through a mail-order pharmacy.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE .' 26.1-36-12.2 (2003). Freedom of choice for
pharmacy services.
1. No third-party payer, including a health care insurer as defined in sec-
tion 26.1-47-01, providing pharmacy services and prescription drugs to
any beneficiary may:
a. Prevent a beneficiary from selecting the pharmacy or pharmacist
of the beneficiary's choice to provide pharmaceutical goods and
services, provided that pharmacist or pharmacy is licensed in this
state;
b. Impose upon any beneficiary selecting a participating or contract-
ing provider a copayment, fee, or other condition not equally im-
posed upon all beneficiaries in the plan selecting a participating or
contracting provider; or
c. Deny any pharmacy or pharmacist the right to participate as a
preferred provider under chapter 26.1-47 or as a contracting pro-
vider for any policy or plan, provided the pharmacist or pharmacy is
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licensed in this state, and accepts the terms of the third-party
payer's contract.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 1, the department of
human services may exclude, from participation in the medical assis-
tance program administered under chapter 50-24.1 and title XIX of the
Social Security Act [Pub. L. 99-97; 79 Stat. 343; 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et
seq.], as amended, any provider of pharmacy services who does not
agree to comply with state and federal requirements goveming the pro-
gram, or who, after so agreeing, fails to comply with those requirements.
3. Any provision in a health insurance policy in this state which violates
the provisions in subsection 1 is void.
4. Any person who violates this section is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor and each violation is a separate offense. The commissioner may
levy an administrative penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars for a
violation of this section.
5. The insurance commissioner shall enforce the provisions of this sec-
tion.
11. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, $S 3634.3 (West 2005). Prescription drug
coverage-Pharmacy contracts-Open pharmacy networks.
A. A health insurance plan or policy or health maintenance organization
providing prescription drugs as a covered benefit shall provide a phar-
macy or group of pharmacies with the right to bid on a periodic basis,
but not less than every three (3) years, on any pharmacy contract to pro-
vide pharmacy services, including, but not limited to, prescription drugs.
B. Nothing in this act shall be interpreted to preclude a health insurance
plan or policy or health maintenance organization from establishing an
open pharmacy network for the provision of pharmacy services, includ-
ing, but not limited to, prescription drugs.
C. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a health insurance
plan or policy or health maintenance organization that maintains an open
pharmacy network.
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12. S.C. CODEANN. $' 38-71-147 (Law. Co-op.2004). Freedom of se-
lection and participation in individual or group accident and
health or health insurance policy or health maintenance organiza-
tion plan.
An individual or group accident and health or health insurance policy
or health maintenance organization plan may not:
(I prohibit or limit a person who is a participant or beneficiary of the
policy or plan from selecting a pharmacy or pharmacist of the person's
choice who has agreed to participate in the plan according to the terms
offered by the insurer; or
(2) deny a pharmacy or pharmacist the right to participate as a contract
provider under the policy or plan if the pharmacy or pharmacist agrees
to provide pharmacy services including, but not limited to, prescription
drugs that meet the terms and requirements set forth by the insurer under
the policy or plan and agrees to the terms of reimbursement set forth by
the insurer.
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, .' 1214(15)(a) (West 2005). Methods,
acts, and practices which are defined herein as unfair or decep-
tive.
(15)(a) The issuance, delivery, issuance for delivery, or renewal of, or
execution of contract for, a health benefits policy or plan which:
(i) Prohibits or limits a person who is an insured or other benefici-
ary of the policy or plan from selecting a pharmacy or pharmacist of
the person's choice to be a provider under the policy or plan to fur-
nish pharmaceutical services or pharmaceutical products offered or
provided by that policy or plan or in any manner interferes with that
person's selection of a pharmacy or pharmacist, provided that the
chosen pharmacy or pharmacist agrees in writing to provide phar-
maceutical services and pharmaceutical products that meet all the
terms and requirements, including the same administrative, finan-
cial, and professional conditions and a minimum contract term of
one year if requested, that apply to all other pharmacies or pharma-
cists who have been designated as providers under the policy or
plan or as participating providers in a pharmacy network established
by the policy or plan.
(ii) Denies a pharmacy or pharmacist the right to participate as a
contract provider of pharmaceutical services or pharmaceutical
products under the policy or plan, or under a pharmacy network es-
tablished by the policy or plan, if the pharmacy or pharmacist
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agrees in writing to provide pharmaceutical services and pharma-
ceutical products that meet all the terms and requirements, includ-
ing the same administrative, financial and professional conditions
and a minimum contract term of one year, if requested, which apply
to pharmacies and pharmacists which have been designated as pro-
viders under the policy or plan or as participating providers in a
pharmacy network established by the policy or plan.
(b) This Paragraph shall not, however, require a health benefits policy or
plan to provide pharmaceutical services or pharmaceutical products.
(c) As used in this Paragraph, the following terms shall be given these
meanings:
(i) "Drug" and "prescription" have the meanings assigned by R.S.
37:1171 and regulations of the Louisiana Board of Pharmacy.
(ii) "Health benefits policy or plan" means any and all health and
accident insurance policies or contracts, including but not limited to
individual, group, family, family group, blanket, and association
health and accident insurance policies, as well as health mainte-
nance organizations and preferred provider organizations, and any
and all other third-party payment plans or contracts, and any and all
other health care or health benefits plans, policies, contracts, or
funds that either in whole or in part provide benefits for pharmaceu-
tical services and pharmaceutical products that are necessary as a
result of or to prevent an accident or sickness.
(iii) "Interferes" or "interferes with" means and includes but is not
limited to the charging to or imposing on an insured or other bene-
ficiary who does not utilize a specified or designated pharmacy or
pharmacist, a copayment fee or other condition not equally charged
to or imposed on all insureds or other beneficiaries in or under the
same program or policy or plan. However, "interferes" or "inter-
feres with" does not mean or include the advertisement, or periodic
dissemination, to all insureds or other beneficiaries of current lists
of all pharmacies or pharmacists who have agreed to participate as a
contract provider pursuant to the requirements of R.S.
22:1214(15)(a)(ii).
(iv) "Pharmaceutical product" means a "drug" and "prescription",
as defined in this Paragraph, and home intravenous therapies,
(v) "Pharmaceutical services" means services that are ordinarily and
customarily rendered by a pharmacy or pharmacist, including the
preparation and dispensing of pharmaceutical products.
(vi) "Pharmacist" means a person licensed to practice pharmacy un-
der the Pharmacy Law and Board of Pharmacy regulations of the
state of Louisiana.
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(vii) "Pharmacy" has the meaning assigned by R.S. 37:1171 and
regulations of the Louisiana Board of Pharmacy.
(d) This Paragraph shall be cited as the "Patient Pharmacy Preference
Act"
B. General AWP statutes
The general AWP statutes are similar in form to the Kentucky statute
upheld in Miller, and for the same reasons cited in Miller will also be up-
held under the new test. Each statute prohibits HMOs from discriminating
against willing providers. As a result, the statutes regulate insurance by pre-
venting discriminatory health care practices, and opening up the provider
networks to all those willing to accept the terms and conditions of the net-
work. Under these laws, insurers and administrators shall not refuse services
from providers who are willing to meet the terms or conditions of the plan:
Idaho,151 Illinois,' 52 Indiana,'53 Kentucky, 15 4 Minnesota, 55 Utah, 15 6 Vir-
ginia, ' 7 Wisconsin,'58 and Wyoming. 59
14. IDAHO CODE . 41-3927 (Michie 1998). Health care providers-
Participation by any qualified, willing provider- Contracts-
Grievance procedure.
(1) Any managed care organization issuing benefits pursuant to the pro-
visions of this chapter shall be ready and willing at all times to enter into
care provider service agreements with all qualified providers of the cate-
gory or categories which are necessary to provide the health care ser-
vices covered by an organization if the health care providers: are quali-
fied under the laws of the state of Idaho, desire to become participant
providers of the organization, meet the requirements of the organization,
and practice within the general area served by the organization.
(2) Nothing in this section shall preclude an organization from refusing
to contract with a provider who is unqualified or who does not meet the
151. IDAHO CODE § 41-3927 (Michie 1998).
152. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/370h (West 2005).
153. IND. CODE ANN. 27-8-11-3(b)-(c) (West 2005).
154. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-110(3) (2002).
155. MrNN. STATE. ANN. § 62Q.095 (West 1999).
156. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-617(7) (2003).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407(B) (Michie 1986).
158. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 628.36 (West 1999).
159. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-22-503(a)(I) (Michie 1995).
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terms and conditions of the organization's participating provider con-
tract or from terminating or refusing to renew the contract of a health
care provider who is unqualified or who does not comply with, or who
refuses to comply with, the terms and conditions of the participating
provider contract including, but not limited to, practice standards and
quality requirements. The contract shall provide for written notice to the
participating hqeath caye pv oider setting forthx any lbeazx af cxtract fr
which the organization proposes that the contract be terminated or not
renewed and shall provide for a reasonable period of time for the par-
ticipating health care provider to cure such breach prior to termination or
nonrenewal. If the breach has not been cured within such period of time
the contract may be terminated or not renewed. Provided however, that
if the breach of contract for which the organization proposes that the
contract be terminated or not renewed is a willful breach, fraud or a
breach which poses an immediate danger to the public health or safety,
the contract may be terminated or not renewed immediately.
(3) Every managed care organization issuing benefits pursuant to this
chapter shall establish a grievance system for providers. Such grievance
system shall provide for arbitration according to chapter 9, title 7, Idaho
Code, or for such other system which provides reasonable due process
provisions for the resolution of grievances and the protection of the
rights of the parties.
(4) No managed care organization may require as an element of any
provider contract that any person agree:
(a) To deny a member access to services not covered by the man-
aged care plan if the member is informed that he will be responsible
to pay for the noncovered services and the member nonetheless de-
sires to obtain such services;
(b) To refrain from treating a member even at that member's re-
quest and expense if the provider had been, but is no longer, a con-
tracting provider under the managed care plan and the provider has
notified the member that the provider is no longer a contracting
provider under the managed care plan;
(c) To the unnegotiated adjustment by the managed care organiza-
tion of the provider's contractual reimbursement rate to equal the
lowest reimbursement rate the provider has agreed to charge any
other payor;
(d) To a requirement that the provider adjust, or enter into negotia-
tions to adjust, his or her charges to the managed care organization
if the provider agrees to charge another payor lower rates; or
(e) To a requirement that the provider disclose his or her contractual
reimbursement rates from other payors.
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(5) A managed care organization shall not refuse to contract with or
compensate for covered services an otherwise eligible provider or non-
participating provider solely because the provider has in good faith
communicated with one (1) or more current, former, or prospective pa-
tient regarding the provisions, terms or requirements of the organiza-
tion's products as they relate to the needs of the provider's patients.
(6) As part of a provider contract, a managed care organization may re-
quire a provider to indemnify and hold harmless the managed care or-
ganization under certain circumstances so long as the managed care or-
ganization also agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the provider un-
der comparable circumstances.
(7) On request and within a reasonable time, a managed care organiza-
tion shall make available to any party to a provider contract any docu-
ments referred to or adopted by reference in the contract except for in-
formation which is proprietary or a trade secret or confidential personnel
records.
(8) A managed care organization shall permit a contracting provider who
is practicing in conformity with community standards to advocate for his
patient without being subject to termination or penalty for the sole rea-
son of such advocacy.
(9) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall apply to provider partici-
pation contracts entered into after July 1, 1994.
15. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ann. $ 5/370h (West 1998). Noninstitutional
providers.
Sec. 370h. Noninstitutional providers. Before entering into any agree-
ment under this Article an insurer or administrator shall establish terms and
conditions that must be met by noninstitutional providers wishing to enter
into an agreement with the insurer or administrator. These terms and condi-
tions may not discriminate unreasonably against or among noninstitutional
providers. Neither difference in prices among noninstutional providers pro-
duced by a process of individual negotiation nor price differences among
other noninstituoinal providers in different geographical areas or different
specialties constitutes unreasonable discrimination.
An insurer or administrator shall not refuse to contract with any nonin-
stitutional provider who meets the terms and conditions established by the
insurer or administrator.
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16. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 304.17C-020 (2002). Discrimination pro-
hibited against willing provider located in area.
A health insurer shall not discriminate against any provider who is lo-
cated within the geographic coverage area of the limited health benefit plan
and who is willing to meet the terms and conditions for participation estab-
lished by the insurer.
17. MNN. STAT. ANN. $S 620.095 (West 1999). Expandedprovider
networks.
Subd. 3. Mandatory offering to enrollees. (a) Each health plan com-
pany shall offer to enrollees the option of receiving covered services
through the expanded network of allied independent health providers estab-
lished under subdivisions I and 2. This expanded network option may be
offered as a separate health plan. The network may establish separate pre-
mium rates and cost-sharing requirements for this expanded network plan,
as long as these premium rates and cost-sharing requirements are actuarially
justified and approved by the commissioner. This subdivision does not ap-
ply to Medicare, medical assistance, general assistance medical care, and
MinnesotaCare.
18. UTAH CODE ANN. $ 31A-22-617 (2003). Preferred provider con-
tract provisions.
Health insurance policies may provide for insureds to receive services
or reimbursement under the policies in accordance with preferred health
care provider contracts as follows:
(1) Subject to restrictions under this section, any insurer or third party
administrator may enter into contracts with health care providers as de-
fined in Section 78-14-3 under which the health care providers agree to
supply services, at prices specified in the contracts, to persons insured
by an insurer.
(a) A health care provider contract may require the health care pro-
vider to accept the specified payment as payment in full, relinquish-
ing the right to collect additional amounts from the insured person.
(b) The insurance contract may reward the insured for selection of
preferred health care providers by"
(i) reducing premium rates;
(ii) reducing deductibles;
(iii) coinsurance;
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(iv) other copyaments; or
(v) any other reasonable manner.
(c) If the insurer is a managed care organization, as defined in Sub-
section 31 A-27-311.5(1)(f):
(i) the insurance contract and the health care provider contract
shall provide that in the event the managed care organization
becomes insolvent, the rehabilitator or liquidator may:
(A) require the health care provider to continue to provide
health care services under the contract until the earlier of:
(I) 90 days after the date of the filing of a petition for re-
habilitatin or the petition for liquidation; or
(II) the date the term of the contract ends; and
(B) subject to Subsection (1)(c)(v), reduce the fees the pro-
vider is otherwise entitled to receive from the managed care
organization during the time period described in Subsection(1)(c)(i)(A);
(ii) the provider is required to:
(A) accept the reduced payment under Subsection
(1)(c)(i)(B) as payment in full; and
(B) relinquish the right to collect additional amounts from
the insolvent managed care organization's enrollee, as de-
fined in Subsection 31A-27-311.5(l)(b);
(iii) if the contract between the health care provider and the
managed care organization has not been reduced to writing, or
the contract fails to contain the language required by Subsec-
tion (1)(c)(i), the provider may not collect or attempt to collect
from the enrollee:
(A) sums owed by the insolvent managed care organization;
or
(B) the amount of the regular fee reduction authorized under
Subsection (1)(c)(i)(B);
(iv) the following may not bill or maintain any action at law
against an enrollee to collect sums owed by the insolvent man-
aged care organization or the amount of the regular fee reduc-
tion authorized under Subsection (1)(c)(i)(B):
(A) a provider;
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(B) an agent;
(C) a trustee; or
(D) an assignee of a person described in Subsections
(1)(c)(iv)(A) through (C); and
(v) notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c)(i):
(A) a rehabilitator or liquidator may not reduce a fee by less
than 75% of the provider's regular fee set forth in the con-
tract; and
(B) the enrollee shall continue to pay the copayments, de-
ductibles, and other payments for services received from the
provider that the enrollee was required to pay before the fil-
ing of:
(I) a petition for rehabilitation; or
(II) a petition for liquidation.
(7)(a) A health care provider or insurer may not discriminate
against a preferred health care provider for agreeing to a con-
tract under Subsection (1).
(b) Any health care provider licensed to treat any illness or injury within
the scope of the health care provider's practice, who is willing and able
to meet the terms and conditions established by the insurer for designa-
tion as a preferred health care provider, shall be able to apply for and re-
ceive the designation as a preferred health care provider. Contract terms
and conditions may include reasonable limitations on the number of des-
ignated preferred health care providers based upon substantial objective
and economic grounds, or expected use of particular services based upon
prior provider-patient profiles.
19. VA. CODE ANN. . 38.2-3407 (Michie 1986). Health benefit pro-
grams.
B. Any such insurer shall establish terms and conditions that shall be
met by a hospital, physician or type of provider listed in § 38.2-3408 in or-
der to qualify for payment as a preferred provider under the policies or con-
tracts. These terms and conditions shall not discriminate unreasonably
against or among such health care providers. No hospital, physician or type
of provider listed in § 38.2-3408 willing to meet the terms and conditions
offered to it or him shall be excluded. Neither differences in prices among
hospitals or other institutional providers produced by a process of individual
negotiations with providers or based on market conditions, or price differ-
ences among providers in different geographical areas, shall be deemed
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unreasonable discrimination. The Commission shall have no jurisdiction to
adjudicate controversies growing out of this subsection.
20. WIS. STAT. ANN. 628.36 (West 1999). Limitations on corpora-
tions supplying health care services.
(1) Payment methods. Any corporation operating a voluntary health care
plan may pay health care professionals on a salary, per patient or fee-for-
service basis to provide health care to policy holders or beneficiaries of
the corporation.
(2) Discrimination against professionals.
(a) In this section:
1. "Health care plan" means an insurance contract providing cover-
age of health care expenses.
2. "Provider" means a health care professional, a health care facility
or a health care service or organization.
(b)l. Except for health maintenance organizations, preferred provider
plans and limited service health organizations, no health care plan may
prevent any person covered under the plan from choosing freely among
providers who have agreed to participate in the plan and abide by its
terms, except by requiring the person covered to select primary provid-
ers to be used when reasonably possible.
2. No provider may be required to participate exclusively in a health care
plan as a condition of participation in it.
3. Except as provided in subd. 4., no provider may be denied the oppor-
tunity to participate in a health care plan, other than a health mainte-
nance organization, a limited service health organization or a preferred
provider plan, under the terms of the plan.
4. Any health care plan may exclude a provider from participation in the
health care plan for cause related to the practice of his or her profession.
5. All health care plans, including health maintenance organizations,
limited service health organizations and preferred provider plans are
subject to s. 632.87(3).
21. WYO. STAT. ANN. $ 26-22-503 (Michie 1995). Policies with incen-
tives or limits on reimbursement authorized; conditions.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary:
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(i) Any provider may enter into a written agreement with any group
or insurer relating to health care services which may be rendered to
insureds, including amounts to be charged the insured for services
rendered;
(ii) Any group or insured may contract with insurers to issue poli-
cies which:
(A) Include incentives for the insured;
(B) Limit reimbursement for health care services.
(iii) Before entering into any written agreement under paragraph
(a)(i) of this section, the group or insurer shall establish terms and
conditions to be required of any provider interested in entering into
the agreement. In no event shall the established terms and condi-
tions discriminate against any Wyoming provider nor shall any
Wyoming provider willing to meet the established terms and condi-
tions be denied the right to enter into any written agreement;
(iv) This section shall not be construed to expand the scope of cov-
erage as defined by any agreement.
(b) In no event may an insurer deny or limit reimbursement to an insured
under this article on the grounds that the insured was not referred to the
provider by a person acting on behalf of or under an agreement with the
insurer.
(c) Any group may contract with an insurer, preferred provider organiza-
tion or health maintenance organization for provision of medical ser-
vices outside of Wyoming for the insured's of that group, provided the
insureds are not restricted from utilizing any Wyoming provider who
provides the same health care services.
C. Statutes that apply to a delineated and articulated set of providers offer
testing ground
Both Arkansas and Georgia have drafted statutes that apply to a limited
set of providers. Georgia's two laws apply only to Blue Cross Blue Shield
contracts or rural health care providers participation in plans in their geo-
graphic regions.160 The Georgia laws appear to satisfy the Miller standard,
so they will escape preemption.
160. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-99-203 & 204 (LEXIS Repl. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
20-16, 33-30-25 (1988).
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22. GA. CODEANN. . 33-20-16 (1976), 33-30-25 (1988).
§ 33-20-16. Certain physicians and health care providers may partici-
pate in corporations.
Every doctor of medicine, every doctor of dental surgery, every podia-
trist, and every health care provider with a class approved by the health care
corporation who is appropriately licensed to practice and who is reputable
and in good standing shall have the right to become a participating physi-
cian or approved health care provider for medical or surgical care, or both,
as the case may be, under such terms or conditions as are imposed on other
participating physicians or approved health care providers within such ap-
proved class under similar circumstances in accordance with this chapter.
§ 33-30-25. Health care insurers authorized to place reasonable limits
on number or classes of preferred providers which satisfy insurer's stan-
dards.
Subject to the approval of the Commissioner under such procedures as
he may develop, health care insurers may place reasonable limits on the
number of classes of preferred providers which satisfy the standards set
forth by the health care insurer, provided that there be no discrimination
against providers on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin, age,
sex, or marital or corporate status, and provided, further, that all health care
providers within any defined service area who are licensed and qualified to
render the services covered by the preferred provider arrangement and who
satisfy the standards set forth by the health care insurer shall be given the
opportunity to apply and to become a preferred provider.
23. ARK. CODEANN. 0 23-99-203 & 204 (LEXIS Repl. 1995).
§ 23-99-203. Definitions.
(a)(1) "Copayment" means a type of cost sharing whereby insured or
covered persons pay a specified predetermined amount per unit of ser-
vice or percentage of health care costs with their health care insurer pay-
ing the remainder of the charge.
(2) The copayment is incurred at the time the service is rendered.
(3) The copayment may be a fixed or variable amount.
(b) "Gatekeeper system" means a system of administration used by any
health benefit plan in which a primary care provider furnishes basic pa-
tient care and coordinates diagnostic testing, indicated treatment, and
specialty referral for persons covered by the health benefit plan.
(c) "Health benefit plan" means any entity or program that provides re-
imbursement, including capitation, for health care services, except and
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excluding any entity or program that provides reimbursement and bene-
fits pursuant to Arkansas Constitution, Amendment 26, Acts 1993, No.
796, or the Public Employee Workers' Compensation Act, § 21-5-601 et
seq., and rules, regulations, and schedules adopted thereunder.
(d) "Health care provider" means those individuals or entities licensed
by the State of Arkansas to provide health care services, limited to the
following:
(1) Physicians and surgeons (M.D. and D.O.); (2) Podiatrists; (3)
Chiropractors; (4) Physical therapists; (5) Speech pathologists; (6)
Audiologists; (7) Dentists; (8) Optometrists; (9) Hospitals; (10)
Hospital-based services; (11) Psychologists; (12) Licensed profes-
sional counselors; (13) Respiratory therapists; (14) Pharmacists;
(15) Occupational therapists; (16) Long-term care facilities; (17)
Home health care; (18) Hospice care; (19) Licensed ambulatory
surgery centers; (20) Rural health clinics; (21) Licensed certified
social workers; (22) Licensed psychological examiners; (23) Ad-
vanced practice nurses; (24) Licensed dieticians; (25) Community
mental health centers or clinics; (26) Certified orthodontists; and
(27) Prosthetists.
(e) "Health care services" means services and products provided by a
health care provider within the scope of the provider's license.
(f) "Health care insurer" means any entity, including, but not limited to:
(1) Insurance companies; (2) Hospital and medical services corpora-
tions; (3) Health maintenance organizations; (4) Preferred provider or-
ganizations; (5) Physician hospital organizations; (6) Third party admin-
istrators; and (7) Prescription benefit management companies, author-
ized to administer, offer, or provide health benefit plans.
§ 23-99-204. Health benefit plan limits.
(a) A health care insurer shall not, directly or indirectly:
(1)(A) Impose a monetary advantage or penalty under a health
benefit plan that would affect a beneficiary's choice among those
health care providers who participate in the health benefit plan ac-
cording to the terms offered.
(B) "Monetary advantage or penalty" includes:
(i) A higher copayment;
(ii) A reduction in reimbursement for services; or
(iii) Promotion of one (1) health care provider over another by
these methods;
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(2) Impose upon a beneficiary of health care services under a health
benefit plan any copayment, fee, or condition that is not equally im-
posed upon all beneficiaries in the same benefit category, class, or
copayment level under that health benefit plan when the beneficiary
is receiving services from a participating health care provider pur-
suant to that health benefit plan; or
(3) Prohibit or limit a health care provider that is qualified under §
23-99-203(d) and is willing to accept the health benefit plan's oper-
ating terms and conditions, schedule of fees, covered expenses, and
utilization regulations and quality standards, from the opportunity to
participate in that plan.
(b) Nothing in this subchapter shall prevent a health benefit plan from
instituting measures designed to maintain quality and to control costs,
including, but not limited to, the utilization of a gatekeeper system, as
long as such measures are imposed equally on all providers in the same
class.
